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THE FUTURE OF MEXICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES INCLUDING
MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
Lic. Michell Nader Schekaiban"
Some recent changes in the money laundering regulations have had a notable
impact in Mexican financial circles. Also, there are two or three major legal
developments that are occurring or about to occur in Mexico which deal with the
current banking crisis by addressing anatocismo , a provision in Mexican law that
forbids lenders to charge interest on interest, and the Fondo Bancario para
Protecci6nde Ahorros (FOBAPROA)2 . For a complete understanding of the current
banking situation it is also necessary to address the creation of credit bureaus, the
impact of reforms in the Banking and Securities Comission and the need to
modernize the Mexican system for the perfection of security interests.
MONEY LAUNDERING
Mexican law first recognized the concept of money laundering in 1989 when the
provisions sanctioning it were added to the tax code3 . However, it enjoyed little
implementation or enforcement until 1995 when money laundering provisions were
added to the criminal code. The criminal code defines money laundering as the
activities of a person who acquires, transfers, exchanges or moves funds or assets
either within Mexico, or from Mexico to a foreign country, knowing that those
funds or assets are from illegal sources, for the purpose of hiding the assets or
funds.4 The penalty for money laundering is between five and fifteen years of
imprisonment, plus an administrative fine. Officers and directors of financial
intermediaries who knowingly aid or abet anyone in the commission of money
laundering may also be charged with money laundering and be subject to the same
penalties. In late 1995, a number of financial laws were amended to empower
Hacienda5 to issue money laundering regulations.
In 1997 the Secretaria de Hacienda (hereinafter Hacienda) issued money
laundering regulations which impose five key responsibilities on Mexican banks:
1) to identify clients; 2) to report certain transactions to the National Banking
Commission; 3) to maintain confidentiality; 4) to prepare and maintain operating

* Lic. Michell Nader Shekaiban obtained his Licenciaturaen Derecho (equivalent to Juris Doctorate) from
the Universidad lberoamericana in Mexico City and earned a Masters of Comparative Law (LL.M.)from
Georgetown University. He served as the Mexican Delegate at the XIX Session of the UN Conference on
International Trade Law and as advisor to he U.S. Treasury Department regarding the 1995 US$ 20 Billion
financial package to Mexico. He has taught Comparative Law and Conmercial Law at the Universidad
Ibeoamericano. Currently he is a partner in the law firm of Jauregul, Navarete, Nader y Rojas, S.C., Mexico City,
which practices in the areas of Banking, Corporate Finance, Mergers and Acquisitions, Insurance, Foreign
Investment and Corporate Law.
1. Anatocimso: Anatocism. "In the civil law, repeated or doubled interest; compound interest; usury."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 84 (6th ed. 1990)

2. FOBAPROA: Fondo Bancario para Protecci6n de Ahorros. Bank fund for the protecion of savings.
FOBAPROA is similar to the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC).
3. Art. 115, C6digo Fiscal de Ia Federaci6n (hereinafter C.F.F.), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
(hereinafter D.O.), 28 de diciembre de 1989.
4. Art 400, C6digo Penal par el Distrito Federal en Materia Comdn y para toda la Republica en Materia
Federal, D.O., 14 de agosto de 1931.
5. Secretaria de Hacienda. Public Finance Ministry
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manuals and systems; and 5) to disseminate money laundering concepts and
manuals among their employees. 6
Transactions that have to be reported to the Banking Commission are of two
types. "Relevant transactions," in excess of US$ 10,000.00 in cash, foreign
currency, travelers' checks or metals, which must be reported quarterly to the
Banking Commision. "Suspicious transactions," which could constitute money
laundering because of the type of transaction, the frequency of transactions, the
nature of the transaction, or a transaction which is either remarkably consistent or
inconsistent with past acts of the client.
Mexican banks are neither required nor permitted to stop money laundering
activities. The banks are not to take the role of the police. Banks are required to
allow the transactions to take place and thereafter report to the Banking
Commission. The Banking Commission in turn reports the transactions to the
ProcuradurtaGeneralde la Republica (Attorney General of the Republic), who
determines whether further monitoring or investigation is needed. As of mid-1998,
there were roughly three million reported relevant transactions of which between
50 and 100 cases are under investigation by both the general tax attorney's office
and the district attorney's office.
The changes in money laundering laws have also had the collateral effect of
shutting many casasde cambio, small scale currency exchanges, because they are
not in a position to comply with some of the requirements. Many of the casas de
cambio are very thinly capitalized and, as a consequence, cannot invest in
automated systems. However, the law permits casas de cambios, as well as banks,
to use manual record keeping systems. Another reason they may not comply with
money laundering rules is that some of those with only one or two outlets cannot
afford to put together a program to detect money laundering. The smallest program
I have seen is 80 pages long and usually based on models used by other banks or
based on the manuals of their foriegn parent banks. The set of rules created by
Hacienda was not suited for the casas de cambio. I am not saying that casas de
cambio should continue to exist as they do today, merely that the responsibility of
compliance was disproportionate to the size of their businesses
ANATOCISM
Anatocism, as conceived in Neo-Romanistic Civil Law, is the charging of
'interest on interest'. The Mexican Supreme Court is currently preparing a decision
to reconcile discrepancies among the lower federal courts as to whether anatocismo
is valid.7 The issue surrounding anatocismobegan following the privatization of
the Mexican banking system when the banks went on a lending spree, granting
thousands of mortgage loans. Since interest rates have been fairly high for the last

6. "Disposiciones de carkacte general a que se refiere el articulo 115 de aLey de Instituciones de Credito,
D.O., 10 de matzo de 1997.
7. At the time to the conference the Mexican Supreme Court had not yet issued a decision on the validity
of the capitalization of interest, or anatocism. Two principal cases challenging the validity of antocism based on
alleged contradictions in the law were under consideration. The two cases were known as 2/98 and 11/98, for the
dates on which they were submitted to the Supreme Court. At the time of publication, decisions resolving the
issues in favor of permitting anatocism had been issued by the Supreme Court.
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thirty years in Mexico, banks created mechanisms to permit borrowers to pay a
minimum amount every month. This frequently was insufficient to amortize the
monthly accrued interest. Banks then applied two different mechanisms to redress
the unpaid interest. The first method used, which is fairly elementary, was to
provide in the loan documents that unpaid interest would further accrue interest.
The second mechanism employed, which is much more creative, provided for the
existence of a line of credit to cover unamortized interest with the unpaid interest
as its principal, which would in turn accrue additional interest.
After the 1994 devaluation of the peso interest rates skyrocketed and many
mortgage borrowers had difficulty paying on their loans. As banks initiated foreclosure proceedings, they encountered a common defense. The borrowers argued that
the scheme used by the banks to postpone interest payments, either by charging
interest on interest or through the use of a separate line of credit, was illegal as the
C6digo Civil (civil code) forbids charging interest on interest at the inception of the
transaction.'
The debtors argue that C6digo de Comercio (Commercial Code) states that if the
purpose of the funds borrowed are not mercantile the loan is not a commercial
transaction, hence a civil transaction.9 Nevertheless, they argue that even if the
mortgages were commercial transactions (as opposed to civil transactions'0 ), the
Commercial Code states that past-due interest cannot accrue interest. However, the
Commercial Code does permit contracting parties to capitalize past-due interest. "
The claim asserted that this provision of the commercial code would only be
enforceable if the agreement to capitalize interest was not made at inception.
The impending Supreme Court's decision will be critical for mortgage loans
created between 1991 and 1994 and, perhaps more importantly, it will influence
future lending practices. It seems apparent that the court will rule in favor of the
banks for three or four reasons. First, the disputed loans were not documented in
the form of loan agreements but as lines of credit. This is an important distinction
as the provision of the Commercial Code that permits parties to capitalize past-due
interest pertains to loan agreements, not lines of credit.'" In fact, lines of credit are
not even governed by the commercial code, but by the Ley de Titulos y Operaciones
de Cr&lito (Law on Credit Instruments and Transactions). 3 So if the mortgages are
regarded as lines of credit, by law the transaction will be a commercial transaction,
not a civil transaction. Hence, they would not be governed by provisions of the
Civil Code. Furthermore, if mortgages are not lines of credit and the Civil Code is
to be applied, it is unclear whether an agreement to capitalize interest made at the
8. "C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal en Materia Comin y para toda la Republica en Materia Federal,
Artfculo 2397", D.O., 26 de marzo 1928. "Las partes no pueden, bajo pena de nulidad, convenir de antemano que
los intereses se capitalicen y que produzcan intereses."
9. "Codigo de Comernio, Art. 358". D.O., del 7 al 13 de octubre de 1889. "Se reputa acantil el prstamo
cuando se contrae en el concepto y con la expresi6n de que las cosas prestadas se destinen a actos de comercio y
no pam necesidades ajenas a 6ste. Se presume mercantil el prdstamo que se contrae entre comerciantes."
10. In Mexican law there is an important distinction between "Commercial Transactions" and "Civil
Transactions" which determines under which codes or laws disputes will be adjudicated.
11. "C6digo de Comercio, Art. 363", D.O., del 7 al 13 de octubre de 1889. "Los intereses vencidos y no
pagados no devengarnn intereses. Los contrantantes podrin, sin embargo, capitalizarlos."
12. In Mexican Law there is an important distinction between a "Loan Agreement' and a "Line of Credit"
which determines under which codes or laws disputes will be adjudicated.
13. "Ley General de Tftulos y Operaciones de Crzxito", D.O. 15 de septiembre de 1932.
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inception of the loan is null and void. In fact, I understand that the court believes
the provisions of the commercial code, assuming that they apply to lines of credit,
permit agreements to capitalize interest made at the inception of a loan.
The next element which the court has been asked to consider is whether the
additional line of credit was granted in violation of the Banking Law which requires
banks to prepare a viability analysis for loans that are being made. 4 The borrowers
argue that the additional lines of credit were created without the required viability
analysis and therefore are invalid. In my opinion, the lack of that analysis should
not affect the court's decision. If, in fact, there was a violation of law, it would be
an administrative law violation which may subject banks to sanctions by the
banking commission.
A third element that the court will be asked to consider concerns the base rate
used to calculate the interest. The contested mortgage agreements use as their base
rate the higher of CETES, treasury bills; the CPP, the basic banking cost funding;
the TILE, the inter-bank rate; or, any other rate. The argument borrowers assert is
that because no specific base rate was specified the loan agreements were
incomplete. Therefore, the borrowers should not be required to pay any interest
calculated using the terms of the agreement. I do not think this can legally nullify
the agreements. In an attempt to correct the ample flexibility banks have enjoyed
the banking commission issued a ruling in 1995 forbidding Mexican banks from
using different base rates in their peso loans. 5 Consequently, Mexican banks can
now use only one of three or four base rates. Hence, they can no longer say the
interest rate "is going to be a spread on top of the base rate and the base rate will be
",16
the higher of the following rates: CETES, CPP, TIlE, etc ...
If the court rules in favor of the banking system there are still two potential
setbacks predicated on basic contract law but for the contested mortgage loans. The
first potential setback is that, in some instances, banks induced borrowers to take
mortgage loans on the argument that at the end of twenty years the loan would be
fully paid. If a borrower can prove that he relied on that representation, he could
demand the court declare the contract null and void on the grounds that his consent
was given in error.
The second possibility once again deals with the concept of error. It is based on
the terms of the agreements, claiming it is almost impossible to understand the
manner in which interest is deferred and thereafter subject to further interest
7 to be created on
charges. The risk for the banking system is for Jurisprudencia"
these arguments. So far, there have been at least two or three cases in which lower
courts have ruled in favor of the borrower, though this has no precedential value.
If there is jurisprudenciaon these grounds, the mortgage contracts will be deemed
null and void, the borrower will be required to return the principal amount of the
loan, and the bank will be required to return the interest payments to the borrower.
14. "Ley de Instituciones de Cr6dito, Art. 65", D.O., 18 dejulio, 1990.
15. Circular 2019 issued by the Mexican Banking Commission in 1995.
16. For example, on April 28, 1999 28-day Cetes were at 18.65%, the CPP was 19.16%, and the 28-day
THE was 22.515%. Eleazar Rodriguez, Mercado Primario,El Financiero (Mexico City), April 28, 1999, at 4A5A.
17. Jurisprudencia. The Mexican equivalent of precedential value or Stare Decisis which incurs when 5
cases with nearly identical facts have been decided in the same manner by the Mexican Supreme Court or certain
Circuit Courts (Tibunales Colegiados de Circuito).
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FOBAPROA
The Fondo Bancariopara Protecci6nde Ahorros, FOBAPROA, is a private trust
managed by the central bank, to which banks make periodical contributions. I
would like to address some of the initial activities of FOBAPROA in 1995, and what
seems the most likely outcome of the FOBAPROA dispute.
FOBAPROA's purpose was to insure deposits. It was funded by the banks,
mangaged through a trust and supervised by a management committee. When a
bank requests support from FOBAPROA the management committee, before
authorizing any support, is required to look to the viability of the support and to
assure that there will be adequate guaranties for repayment. In 1995, as a
consequence of the financial crisis, the purpose of FOBAPROA was broadened
using the existing ample powers of its charter. FOBAPROA's new mandate was to
provide support to the beleaguered banking system through two distinct programs.
Through the first program, "the capitalization program," FOBAPROA would
purchase non-performing loans from banks on a one-to-one basis with notes
guaranteed by the federal government. Under this program FOBAPROA required
that a bank's shareholders contribute, for example, $1.00 as capital to the bank for
every $2.00 of non-performing loans received by FOBAPROA. Hence, it transfered
huge packages of non-performing loans from the banks to FOBAPROA in exchange
for government guaranteed promissory notes that were accruing interest at market
rates. Although the loans FOBAPROA received were accruing interest, it was not
being paid and frequently it was unlikely that even the pricipal could be recovered.
Under the second program, the "clean-up program," FOBAPROA purchased nonperforming loans from banks at one-to-one with notes guaranteed by the federal
government to facilitate the divestiture of the non-performing loans from the banks
to third parties.
One of the debates on the FOBAPROA issue was whether the government had the
power to guarantee the FOBAPROA notes. Without getting much into the details
of Constitutional Law, I do not think the government had the power to guarantee
those loans. Primarily, because the rules established in the constitution were not
followed.'" Secondly, because the promissory notes and guarantees were not
registered in the public debt registry maintained by Hacienda. In March 1998, the
amount of registered internal debt in Mexico was roughly US$ 40 billion and the
amount of non-performing loans acquired by FOBAPROA was approximately US$
65 billion, that is about 13-14% of Mexico's 1998 GNP.
On a side note, one of the reasons that the financial package presented to
Congress in May of 1998 got stuck was Congressional unwillingness to approve
converting the FOBAPROA notes into public debt, in the sense that the government
would guarantee to pay the debt over a certain number of years. The current status
of the notes is that they are only paid to the extent autorized by Congress in each
annual budget. The issue is therefore whether the debt will remain as it is, be
voided, or become direct public debt.

18. Art. 73, VIII, Constitucin Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
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On September 30, 1998 there seemed to be the serious possibility of a resolution
when an agreement was reached outside of Congress by all political parties 9 except
the PartidoRevolucionarioDemocrafico.' However, because the PRD represents
a minority, its approval is unneccesary should it go to a vote.
There are four or five basic points in the proposed solution.2' The first, which
I think is one of two critical points, is that FOBAPROA will return to the nonintervened banks all loans in excess of five million pesos, roughly half a million
dollars, in exchange for smaller non-performing loans. Initially, FOBAPROA
received corporate loans, as opposed to small loans made to individuals. The banks
taking back the major or corporate loans will therefore be re-assuming their full
non-performance risk.
Secondly, there will be a new relief program for small borrowers which should
also provide incentives to performing borrowers. The third point calls for the
creation of a new vehicle to dispose of the assets retained by FOBAPROA. The
fourth point, requires that a new entity be created to insure deposits.
Finally, the fifth requirement is that the FOBAPROA notes not be converted into
direct public debt. Ideally the FOBAPROA notes will be repaid using first funds
received through repayment of loans held by FOBAPROA; secondly, by divestiture
of the assets guaranteeing loans held by FOBAPROA; thirdly, using funds
contributed by the banks themselves; and, finally, using only those amounts that
Congress approves yearly. Also, there should be a major overhaul of the Mexican
legal system to provide a better setting for banking activities.
One issue that makes me skeptical is that in the last three or four years
FOBAPROA has not been able to divest assets of the non-performing loans either
directly or through any other method such as the now defunct VVA.' Because the
problems impeding diveseture have been mainly legal and tax issues I am skeptical
that the proposed changes will have impact on divesteture.
For example, in March or April of 1998, the net worth of the assets acquired by
FOBAPROA were roughly US$ 30 billion, though it had issued notes worth US$
65 billion. Therefore, even if those assets could be collected or liquidated all at
once, FOBAPROA would have a shortfall of US$ 35 billion. Judging from
experience, where there is a bad loan in Mexico, the longer it takes to reach a
solution, the less value the ultimate lender will receive.
FERNANDO MONTES, The World Bank: I have one question regarding the
agreement between the banks and FOBAPROA for the purchase of bad assets in
exchange for a capitalization agreement. On top of that agreement they had capped
the losses of the banks at between 25% and 30% at the end of the sale of the bad

19. The agreement was made between the ruling Panido Revolucionario Institucional(hereinafter PRI) or
Institutional Revolucionary Party; and, the Partidode Accidn Nacional(hereinafter PAN) or National Action Party,
the principal Mexican right wing opposition party.
20. Partido Revolucionario Democratico. The Democratic Revolucionary Party, the principal Mexican
liberal opposition party.
21. At the time of the confernce, no resolution had been formalized. However, shortly before publication
an agreement had been reached which created the IPAB, or the Institutopara Proteci6nde Ahorros Bancarios,
to replace FOBAPROA.
22. VVA. Valuaci6ny Venta de Activos SA. de CV. (Valuation and liquidation of Assets. Inc.) A stock
company organized by FOBAPROA for the purpose of divesting bank loans and forficted assets. It was created
in 1996 and is now in the process of being liquidated.
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loans. All the proposals indicated this agreement would not be honored, or would
be changed. Do you see this as a potentially contentious issue, maybe up for legal
action? For example, if I am a commercial bank, I sell a hundred pesos of bad loans
to FOBAPROA in good faith, I cap my losses at 25 pesos. Now all the proposals
say, "No, you are going to get 100% of the bad loans at the end."
NADER: What you are saying is that when the banks sold their portfolio to
FOBAPROA, FOBAPROA had recourse to the banks basically for 25% of the
unpaid amount. So the banks would share 25% of the loss. Your question, as I
understand it, is that if the agreement is implemented, where will the commercial
banks stand? Could FOBAPROA make them take the bad loans back? Technically
I think the answer is no. By the same token, I do not think that the banks can collect
from the government on the FOBAPROA note, without the government guarantee
it is worthless. If the recent agreement among the political parties is implemented,
I think the government will have to create a consensus with the banks.
However, I am not sure that the banks will be in a worse position than they are
today because I do not know what type of small loans the banks are going to transfer
to FOBAPROA in exchange for the big loans. Assuming the small loans are as bad
as the big loans, perhaps the banks will unwittingly come out better. If you have
hundreds or thousands of small mortgages with bad loans and it is difficult to find
the borrower, difficult to find the assets and very expensive to collect, as a bank you
might be better off trying to work out, restructure, or divest a smaller number of big
loans. This in no way means there is no issue but, at the end of the day the
FOBAPROA note is not very valuable without a government guarantee. However
this may be the leverage neccesary to forge a consensus between the government
and the banks.
BANKING AND SECURITIES COMISSION REFORM
In the late 1980s the government merged the Comissi6n Nacional de Bancos
(CNB), Banking Commission, and the Comissidn Nacional de Valores (CNV)
Securities Commission, creating a new commission, the Comissi6n Nacional
Bancariay de Valores (CNBV), to regulate banking and securities firms, leasing
companies, factoring companies, exchange houses, and perhaps a few other
financial industries. At the same time Mexico was moving away from having
financial intermediaries specialized in financial services (there were no anti-trust
issues as there might be in other countries), towards the concept of universal
banking. Mexico did this by creating holding companies whose only purpose would
be to own the controlling share of financial intermediaries. This raised the issue of
who would supervise the holding company: the Banking Commission, Securities
Commission, or Insurance Commission (Commisidn Nacional de Seguros y
Fianzas,CNSF). It was decided that the holding company would be regulated by
the commission that would otherwise regulate the pre-eminent intermediary owned
by the holding company. So, if the pre-eminent intermediary was an insurance
company, then the holding company would be governed by the Insurance
Commission.
Having the Insurance Commission regulate a holding company that has a bank,
a securities firm, a leasing company and a larger insurance company is not
necessarily the best decision. The decision to regulate the holding company based
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on its largest intermediary was made by default. This has impaired the ability of the
Commissions to monitor the holding companies, and especially to accurately
monitor the intermediaries that would otherwise be regulated by other commissions.
In all fairness to the government and the Comissions, regarding conflicts of
interest, there was an explosion of intermediaries between 1990 and 1994. Before
Mexico privatized the banking system in 1990 and 1991, there were roughly
eighteen commercial banks. Afterwards there was a point when there were over
forty commercial banks. Therefore, the banking comission had to supervise more
than twice the number of banks they had previously in their charge, in addition to
all the leasing companies and other intermediaries which they also supervise. So
I think the problem was an inappropriate infrastructure not fit for the market
conditions. Furthermore, there was quite a bit of duplication of reporting
requirements for intermediaries. There are many intermediaries that essentially file
the same information with the Central Bank and the Banking Commission, changing
the format only.
There have been cases where the banking commission did not do their work
properly, though it may not have constituted a conflict of interest. An example is
the case of ABACO-CONFIA, which is a conglomerate of a very prominent
securities firm, ABACO, who acquired a very solid bank, CONFIA. A holding
company, ABACO-CONFIA was created to manage the two intermediaries. It was
no secret that the bank, CONFIA, was going through a difficult time and yet the
CNBV allowed the holding company to issue a large volume of convertible bonds
that eventually were converted into equity and now have no value. I think that
having to supervise more than one type of intermediary at a time has impaired the
ability of the Banking Commission to do its job and is not the best alternative.
CREDIT BUREAUS

There are at least a couple of trends that are worrisome. One is the creation of
credit bureaus. Banks cannot grant loans to their customers without consulting
credit bureaus for the preparation of a credit analysis.' When a credit bureau issues
a negative report on a customer, banks are required to reserve up to 100% for that
specific loan.
Unfortunately, some banks use the credit bureau in a manner that is contrary to
it's purpose and works against the system. In certain instances banks are using the
credit bureaus to exact certain conditions from their borrowers and also from their
shareholders. As I read the law and the rules, there is nothing that permits a bank
to issue a credit report on shareholders who have no privity with the bank. The
government will have to take this issue into account because a number of credit
bureaus have already been created and some are starting to be implemented. The
worst thing that could happen would be for those credit bureaus to be used for a
purpose other than the one for which they were created.

23. "Circular 1413" issued by the National Banking and Securities Commission on September 30, 1998
requires Mexican Banks to obtain a report from a Credit Bureau before granting a credit. If a bank issues a credit
without consulting a credit bureau report they must maintain reserves of up to 100% of the credit amount.
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The second trend I see developing more and more is that banks are exerting
pressure on non-performing borrowers to evict them out of the banking system.
There are a number of cases in which banks discontinue banking services such as
deposits, check cashing or wire transfers for borrowers with whom they have
troubled loans. There are banks that have created groups to support each other in
evicting these borrowers from the banking system. Clearly banks are entitled to
recover their loans. However, such coordinated action by banks could fall within
the jurisdiction of the Comisi6n de Competencia Econ6mica.24 Unfortunately, by
the time an anti-trust case is cleared, a borrower that has not been able to bank with
a number of banks may be irreparably harmed. In addition to these two examples,
I think there are a number of practices both within the banking system and among
borrowers that need to be monitored. Eventually the government will have to create
a more efficient mechanism to prevent those practices.
MODERNIZATION OF THE MEXICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PERFECTION OF SECURITY

INTERESTS

There is an urgent need to modernize Mexico's system for the creation of
security arrangements. One of the stumbling blocks is the State-run registration
system. There is at least one public registry in each State. According to the
Ministry of Commerce the registries do not have the funds to invest in the creation
of a new system. The modernization of the system would neccessarily entail a
reduction of registration fees. In many jurisdictions (in all I believe, other than
Mexico City), registration fees are a percentage of the amount that is being secured.
This creates significant revenue for each State. In addition to the substantive
obstacles a significant political stumbling block must also be overcome to create a
system that could compete with other systems in the world.
Finally, the future of financial services needs reform to facilitate contracting,
foreclosure, litigation and insolvency procedures. There is also significant pressure
on the opposing parties to assure that white collar crime is more effectively
punished.

24. Comisidn Nadonal de Compewendfa Econnmica (National Commission of Economic Jurisdiction) The
division of the Mexican Government which detects and penalizes Anti-Trust policies.

